Page 71 - Breeding and regulatory opportunities, Renaud

Seed Regulation in the US

sector. Klein and Winickof (2011) also note that the organic regulatory process

overall (not just seed) is drawing in an increasing number of stakeholders initially

each in pursuit of their own agenda. Through their engagement their roles and

expertise, the resulting regulatory procedures and structures are becoming

legitimised and normalised in the ways that May and Finch (2009) describe

their theory of normalization processes. These perspectives are considered in

the next section in greater detail, and thereafter a review of lessons learned for

future considerations.

2.4.1 Coalitions, governance and the rules of the game

DeLeon and DeLeon (2002) describe how in the process of policy implementa-

tion, coalitions of interest and inluence emerge as governance networks in

industrialized societies. These coalitions may be described as co-evolving

relationships among stakeholders (Kickert et al., 1997) who are connected by

exchanges of resources (such as technical guides on organic seed production

in this case) and information (such as the organic seed database) which are

mobilised because individually the stakeholders cannot attain their own goals

without orchestrating collective action. These coalitions have been seen by

some (e.g. Rhodes, 1996) as competing with and weakening the authority

of the government, yet by others (e.g. Peters and Pierre, 1998) as providing

the government with additional capacity for governance (as demonstrated in

this case by multi-stakeholder initiatives to develop regional varietal testing

networks). In this latter view, the government would continue to play a strong

but new role: that of meta-governor of the ‘rules of the game’ that guide and

guard the functioning and legitimacy of the networks. That is, the actions of

governance networks are not independent of the state, they are circumscribed

by and draw upon state power and resources. While networks might pursue

some of their goals through private, non-governmental means, typically

networks are attentive to the opportunities for accessing governmental

funding and legitimacy (Meuleman, 2008). The US government’s position

with respect to the organic seed regulation appears to be somewhat reliant

on the expectation that the organic sector will self-organize around its

interpretation, and be driven by, coalitions of interest, and thereby enhance

the overall governance of the sector.

53