Page 265 - Latent Defect or Excessive Price?Exploring Early Modern Legal Approach to Remedying Defects in Goods Exchanged for Money - Bruijn

CHAPTER FIVE
though the seller had not breached an explicit warranty. This decision is contrary to Doneau and Vinnius' views and in conformity with the views put forward by Bronckhorst and Grotius.
By the same token, in case number 2841, decided in 1734, the buyer of an encumbered plot of land does not consider a remedy for all damages, though he mentions the seller's knowledge of burdens. A majority of the Supreme Court judges considered that the sellers should explicitly have stated all the land's burdens or have exonerated themselves in order to escape liability for price reduction. Hence, an encumbrance on land gives ground for a remedy irrespective of the seller's fraud but for price reduction only.245
However, in a 1750 case246 reported by Bijnkershoek's son-in-law Pauw, something seems to have changed. The buyer of a distillery started proceedings because of servitudes on it. Contrary to what was decided in the above mentioned cases, the Supreme Court discussed both price reduction and rescission as conceivable remedies against a knowing seller.247
'Yet, the burdens are too trifling to merit a rescission of the contract because of their being kept secret. On the grounds of D. 19.1.1.1, 39, and D. 21.2.69.5 there is only a remedy for price reduction, if the seller kept silent about these servitudes.'248
Hence, if the seller is in bad faith, light burdens trigger a remedy for price reduction, whereas encumbrances of greater portent allow for rescission. This is a reasoning not encountered in Roman-Dutch legal doctrine or practice before. Though it comes close to Voet's view that against knowing sellers of encumbered things a remedy for all the buyer's damages lies, the approach of the Supreme Court here is unique in its kind.249
5.2.4.2 Roman-Frisian legal practice
The Provincial Court of Friesland adopted a different approach from that of the Supreme Court of Holland, Zeeland and West-Friesland. On 21 December 1701, it decided in a
245 Bijnkershoek, Observationes, vol. 3, no. 2841, p. 611: '...plerisque Senatoribus visum est, scientesque utrumque onus... debuisse utrumque et hic exprimere, generalem enim enunciationem non sufficere; Brom, Urteilsbegründungen, pp. 200-201, res. pp. 355-357.
246 Pauw, Observationes, vol. 1, no. 339a (nov.), p. 240; Brom, Urteilsbegründungen, pp. 206–207, res. pp. 394-396.
247 Though not all judges share this view. In the resolution accompanying the case one can read Judge Van Nispen proclaim that 'if it \[the servitudes\] had been suppressed deliberately, only the action for price reduction would ensue (So't met studie versweegen is, souw daar uit vloen en alleen een actio quanto minoris...)', Brom, Urteilsbegründungen, p. 395.
248 Pauw, Observationes, vol. 1, no. 339a (nov.), p. 240: 'Levioris quidem momenti erant ea onera, quam ut ob eorum reticentiam rescindendus esset contractus, verum cum ex l. 1 et 39 D. de action. emt. \[D. 19.1.1.1/39\] et l. 69, §5, D. de evict. \[D. 21.2.69.5\] saltem emti actio seu quanti minoris competat, si quas servitutes reticuerit venditor...',
249 Contrary Brom, Urteilsbegründungen, p. 206; the distinction between minor and major encumbrances is even explicitly ruled out by Van Leeuwen, Censura, to D. 19.1, no. 15, p. 550: 'Nec distinguitur moribus nostris inter servitutes minores et majores, quae emptori rem prorsus inutilem reddere solebant... quae quum patrimoniorum instar apud nos possideantur, nec personalibus praestationibus obnoxia sint, propterea quum emptor iustam non satis resiliendi ab ipso contractu causam habeat, ex eo non nisi quanti minoris agi potest... '.
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