Page 9 - THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE’S ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES- A MULTI-METHOD INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS Ryan Gautier

3.1. Ex Ante Mechanisms 155 3.2. On-The-Spot Monitoring Mechanisms 161 3.3. Ex Post Mechanisms 162
4. Alternative Theoretical Explanations for Agency Problems 166
4.1. Critiques of the Principal-Agent Approach 166 4.2. Explanations of OCOG/Host City Actions 168 4.3. Addressing Incentive Incompatibility 170
5. Conclusion: A Mandate to Avoid the ‘Worst Outcomes’ of the Games 172
Chapter Seven – Learning from the World Bank: Towards an Accountability Forum for the Olympic Games 175 1. Introduction 175 2. A Comparative Analysis of the IOC and the World Bank 176 2.1. A Functionalist Comparative Law Approach 176 2.2. The IOC and the World Bank: Functionally Comparable? 178 3. Comparing the IOC and the World Bank in Terms of Accountability 181 3.1. Conceptualizing the Problem 181 3.2. Describing the Accountability Forums of IOC and the World Bank 181 3.3. Similarities and Differences between the IOC and the World Bank 195 3.4. Explanation for the Differences 199 4. Towards an Accountability Forum for the Olympic Games 201 5. Conclusion: World Bank Action and IOC Inaction 205
Chapter Eight – Conclusion: Towards a More Accountable Olympic Movement 207
1. Introduction 2. The Research
2.1. Summary of the Research
2.2. Research Questions and Answers 2.3. Limitations of the Thesis
3. Implications of Findings
3.1. Findings Related to Literature
3.2. Practical Implications of Findings
4. Further Research 5. Final Remarks
Bibliography
Appendix I – Hosts of the Olympic Games Summary
Nederlandse samenvatting Acknowledgements
About the Author
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