Page 45 - THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE’S ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES- A MULTI-METHOD INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS Ryan Gautier
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Chapter Two – Global Governance and Legitimacy
alternatives were long-lasting highlights the low likelihood of a feasible challenger to the IOC as an actor and the Olympic Games as the premier sports mega-event.52
It would seem then, that the legitimacy the IOC and the Olympic Games require to carry out their mandate is at a moderate level. The level is likely higher than an average NGO, given its regulatory power. But, it is not as high as an intergovernmental organisation or IO, given the moderate importance of the sporting regime, and the difficulty in establishing an alternative regime. It is possible that the nigh-monopolistic nature of the IOC and the Olympic Games means that legitimacy is rather unimportant for the IOC and the Games. However, as will be discussed in Part 3.4, the IOC and the Olympic Games may be experiencing a problem with legitimacy.
3.2. Constructing A Legitimacy Framework
How does an institution establish legitimacy? Legitimacy is not constructed through coercion of an actor through the threat of the use of force, nor is it brought about through naked appeals to the actor’s self-interest.53 These actions are external motivations to compliance, rather than a fostering of an internal belief in compliance. How then, might an institution foster the belief that it is legitimate? At the level of the state, legitimacy has traditionally been conceptualised as being founded upon a social contract between the state and the people. So long as the state fulfils its role vis-à-vis the people—and conceptions of what that role may be differ amongst peoples and their states—the people confer legitimacy upon the state.54 Some more recent works have posited that the legitimacy of the state depends less upon the fulfilment of a social contract and instead focuses on democracy.55 Regardless whether state legitimacy is engendered through fulfilment of a social contract, or through democratic input, such conceptualisations do not translate well to the
52 Setting up competitor leagues in professional sport has also proven difficult, evidenced by the failure of competitors to the National Basketball Association, National Football League, and National Hockey League in North America. For an economics take on why this story plays out, see Xiao Gang Che and Brad R. Humphreys, ‘Rival Sports League Formation and Competition’ in Plàcido Rodríguez, Stefan Késenne and Ruud Koning (eds), The Economics of Competitive Sports (Edward Elgar 2015). A similar story has played out in Europe in regards to football. See, e.g., Katarina Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football (Springer 2015) 53–73.
53 Hurd (n 63) 34.
54 See, e.g., Collingwood (n 35) 448.
55 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 The American Journal of International Law 596, 599.
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