Page 40 - THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE’S ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES- A MULTI-METHOD INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS Ryan Gautier

Chapter Two – Global Governance and Legitimacy
example, Turkey has an Olympic Law, which establishes the primacy of the Olympic Charter.30 Other countries and regions have legislation related to sports mega-events that is meant to not only relate to one particular mega-event, but to have an “evergreen” status.31 Some of these requirements by the IOC will impact individuals directly. For instance, local businesses may be ‘swept up’ under anti-ambush marketing measures, or individuals may be inadvertently harmed by onerous restrictions on ticket re-sale.32 Yet, individuals are less-often affected by particular IOC rules and standards, and are more affected by what I have labelled the worst outcomes of hosting the Olympic Games. Decisions taken by those who are tasked by the IOC to organise the Games may lead to harmful outcomes such as the use of forced labour to construct Olympic venues, the forced eviction of persons to make way for Olympic infrastructure, or environmental harms, which are described in more detail in Chapter Four. Thus, an event that the IOC holds the right to, and sets various rules and standards around, has the potential to significantly harm a number of individuals.
An important distinction between the Olympic Games and many other global governance institutions is that the IOC does not bypass the state, but often co-opts the state. In seeking to host the Olympic Games, the host city (and host country) demonstrates willingness to adhere to various IOC rules and requirements as part of the host selection process. Once selected to be the host of the Games, the host city enters into a contractual relationship with the IOC to organise the Olympic Games in accordance with the IOC’s requirements. As such, the host city acts as an agent to the IOC, a relationship examined in Chapter Six. Some scholars see this relationship as part of a broader neoliberal process, whereby a private actor (the IOC) relies on the state to provide resources (e.g., financial, infrastructural) for its benefit.33 Regardless of whether or not the Olympic Games are part of such a process, the IOC’s relationship with the state puts the IOC in a position where it
30 Code of Olympic Games to be Conducted in Istanbul City No. 3796 (Turkey).
31 Major Sporting Events Act, 2009, 30/2009 (Victoria, Australia); Major Events Management Act 2007, 2007
No. 35, s. 3 (New Zealand). For a discussion and a comparison of these acts, see Hayden Opie and Elizabeth Toomey, ‘Trans-Tasman Sport and Law—Some Observations’ (2010) 16 Canterbury Law Review 155.
32 Ryan Gauthier, ‘Major Event Legislation: Lessons from London and Looking Forward’ (2014) 14 The International Sports Law Journal 58, 64–65.
33 Fernanda Sánchez and Anne-Marie Broudehoux, ‘Mega-Events and Urban Regeneration in Rio de Janeiro: Planning in a State of Emergency’ (2013) 5 International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development 132, 136; C. Michael Hall, ‘Urban Entrepreneurship, Corporate Interests and Sports Mega-Events: the Thin Policies of Competitiveness Within the Hard Outcomes of Neoliberalism’ (2006) 54 S2 The Sociological Review 59, 63–64.
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